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ABSTRACT
The consistently successful delivery of projects remains an ambition that many
organisations do not achieve. Whilst the reasons behind project failure are
many, one recognised factor is the ‘planning fallacy’ – over-optimism in the
planning phase of a project. Whilst the planning phase of a project may be a
battle for acceptance and resource allocation, the execution phase is a battle for
delivery. Based on both qualitative and quantitative data gathered from a project
management simulation, this study set out to establish whether optimism bias
persists beyond the planning phase and into the execution phase, and, if so, to
explore the reasons why. The results confirm the extent and impact of optimism
bias in initial project planning. More importantly, the contribution of this study is
to demonstrate on-going or sustained false optimism.
Keywords: Project, Optimism, Psychological bias, Experiment
3INTRODUCTION
Widespread project failure is an organisational and individual problem that
warrants examination. At its most simple, in a failed project, targets are set for
key parameters – classically cost, time and benefits – and then these are
missed. Logically, there are two reasons for missing a target – either it was not
attainable in the first place, or the implementation suffered failure of some kind.
The first of these causes – how targets are set through planning and approval
processes – has been well explored. Of particular interest to this paper is that
behavioural interventions have been shown to be present in the project planning
and approval processes. These include ‘delusional optimism’ on the part of
stakeholder groups – planners, managers and assessors. The effect of this is to
make planning and approval processes far less effective than expected.
The second of the causes – the process of implementing projects – is also less
effective than expected. Our contention is that understanding implementation
failures is just as important as the planning and approval process, and that there
are behavioural interventions that contribute to this. This paper considers the
role of delusional optimism in the project implementation.
The literature shows that the source of this optimism is made up of three
components: technical error, political or strategic misrepresentation, and
psychological bias. This paper reports on a study in which we take an
unprecedented opportunity to eliminate two of these sources and focus on the
psychological bias component of this error, to investigate whether it persists
over the life-cycle of a project. We report the results of a quasi-experiment using
both quantitative and qualitative data gathered from 28 teams performing a
profit-maximising project simulation. All teams were fully familiarised with the
4prescribed techniques to plan and control the simulated project. Each team
received the same (near perfect) information, was given time to prepare their
plans, and was required to make profit predictions both initially and after each
round of the simulation.
Only seven teams achieved a result consistent with or better than their initial
forecasts – these were the ‘performers’. The remaining 75% of teams had over-
estimated their performance by more than 20% – in most cases, substantially
more. They had exhibited optimism bias. This was to be expected. The interest
for this study was in the pattern of how this optimism changed during project
implementation. The differences in the behaviours of these teams were notable.
A second cluster recognised from a fairly early stage that they wouldn’t make
their profit forecasts and revised their forecasts downwards accordingly. They
were still overly optimistic about their performance, but did make profit
adjustments in the right direction. These were the ‘trackers’. A third cluster,
despite getting feedback both from the performance data and the tutors
indicating that the group was going to under-perform, did not represent this in
their ongoing predictions. Indeed all of these teams came to a point late in the
simulation where their profit predictions were seen to ‘fall off a cliff.’ This cluster
we termed the ‘lemmings’. A fourth cluster, once they realised they were not
going to hit their target, abandoned the reporting process altogether. These
were the ‘lost’.
Qualitative data collected during the study, demonstrate that expertise in the
‘know-how’ to apply planning tools and the ‘know-what’ about the parameters of
the project reinforces sustained false optimism. Paradoxically, instead of
providing realism and planning accuracy, the perceived ease of use and
usefulness of planning tools reinforced a false sense of certainty on the part of
5these teams. The implications of such behaviours for managers are discussed.
Most significantly, whilst there are now corrective factors applied to estimates
for large capital projects relating to initial estimation bias, there is potential
benefit to correct for sustained false optimism, either through identifying and
preventing its causes, or accepting and compensating for its effects.
The intention of the paper is to explore sustained false optimism in projects. The
review of current literature is followed by an evaluation of the method of a
quasi-experiment. The results section offers a fourfold classification of sustained
false optimism and its interpretation. The implications and contributions are
discussed; the contribution of this paper is in confirming the presence of what
we have termed, sustained false optimism during project implementation, and
some indications of the contributors to this. We describe the challenges that this
provides for organisations and conclude with directions for further research.
PROJECT PERFORMANCE
A project is a “vehicle of change”, which needs to be delivered in a defined time
at an agreed cost (Buttrick, 1997, p. 20). Key features characterising a project
are: a project is unique; each one will differ from every other in some respect;
projects have specific objectives (or goals) to achieve; they require resources
and have budgets; they have schedules and require the effort of people; and,
measures of quality apply (Field and Keller, 1998). However, these common
elements of a project are also included in routine operations except for one –
uniqueness (Turner, 1993). In contrast to a “pure” operation, a project includes
a certain degree of uniqueness and dissimilarity as Cicmil (1997, p. 392) notes:
6“In any project situation, there is always someone (the client, customer)
who has a unique need (an idea) for something new, and some, often
vague, expectations about tangible outcomes (the creation) of it…”
This level of uniqueness, potentially poorly defined expectations, combined with
fundamental uncertainties about the future mean that estimations of outcomes
are needed to determine whether a project business case is viable. If accepted,
these estimates typically become the measure for success against which the
project will be assessed. The compilation and treatment of forecasts then has a
direct impact on whether a project goes ahead and whether it is perceived as a
success or a failure when complete. The volume of projects that are perceived as
failures means that the generation and treatment of estimates is worth studying.
INACCURACIES IN FORECASTS
An inaccurate forecast is one where the project actual outturn deviates from the
planned or expected outcome. It has been recognised for some time that
inaccuracies in forecasts are problematic (e.g. Flyvbjerg et al., 2006, Kemerer,
1991). Road, rail, building and IT projects alike suffer under inaccurate forecasts
(H. M. Treasury, 2003, MacDonald, 2002): “There is a demonstrated,
systematic, tendency for project appraisers to be overly optimistic”. (H. M.
Treasury, 2003, p. 2). Project appraisers – planners, managers, sponsors and
others – are over-optimistic in their forecasts as to when projects will be
completed, within what budget and of what quality (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002,
Schnaars, 1989). Flyvbjerg et al. (2002, p. 286) suggest the following about the
persistent trend towards underestimation in transportation infrastructure
projects:
7“No learning seems to take place in this important and highly costly sector
of private decision making. This seems strange and invites speculation
that the persistent existence over time, location, and project type of
significant and widespread cost under-estimation is a sign that an
equilibrium has been reached: Strong incentives and weak dis-incentives
for under-estimation may have taught project promoters what there is to
learn, namely that cost under-estimation pays off.”
Optimism may have both beneficial (Armor and Zanna, 1998) and harmful
consequences (Baumeister et al., 1993). The overestimation of estimates such
as project costs may reduce the pressure on project members to be productive
(Abdel-Hamid, 1986). Underestimated project cost estimates may enable
organisations to competitively bid for business, even though the winning bidder
may be the one with the worst prospect of profit (Mumpower, 1991, Thaler,
1988). Current research literature provides a number of explanations for
optimism bias (Buehler and Griffin, 2003, Connolly and Dean, 1997) as being
either technical, political or psychological in nature. Understanding these in
isolation is a first step and one to which we are contributing in this paper.
Understanding how these effects combine will be an interesting field for further
study.
Technical
Forecasting inaccuracies are suggested by some studies (e.g. Morris and Hough,
1987) to be caused by technical errors. ‘Technical error’ refers to unreliable or
inaccurate data, the absence of data or the use of imperfect forecasting
techniques.
8The lack of reliable or accurate data (e.g. from previous projects) may be due to
the context in which forecasting is applied. Meyer et al. (2002) compare new
product development projects in four industries in terms of four dimensions –
the level of chaos (unpredictability in the initial and underlying conditions),
unforeseen uncertainty (the level of unpredictable emergence during the
project), foreseen uncertainty (the level of predictable emergence during the
project) and the level of variation (the difference between this and previous
projects). Their study demonstrated a problem for forecasting in the internet
industry in particular – where there was a high level of chaos which would
prevent accurate forecasting (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Uncertainty profiles (Meyer, Loch, & Pich, 2002, p. 96)
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High levels of chaos mean that project planners rely on the validity of
probabilistic conclusions of future events which are based on historical data
(Frosdick, 1997). In this respect Shakle (1952, p. 5) states:
“The theory of probability, in the form which has been given to it by
mathematicians and actuaries, is adapted to discovering the tendencies of
a given system under indefinitely repeated trials or experiments. In any
set of such trials, each trial is, for the purpose of discovering such a
9tendency, given equal weight with all the others. No individual trial is
considered to have any importance in itself for its own sake, and any
tendency which may be inductively discovered or predicted as a priority
for the system, tells us nothing about any single individual trial which we
may propose to make in the future.”
The degree of chaos, particularly in internet projects, implies that forecasts
remain inaccurate. Although perfect knowledge about the future state of an
environment is not possible, technical errors and consequently over and
underestimation of project forecasts will occur despite attempts at correction
through clarification and exactitude. However, based on empirical testing of
data, technical explanations for optimism bias may be less important than they
appear. Firstly, if technical error is the reason for inaccuracy, one would expect
an equal spread of optimism and pessimism over time. However, empirical
findings show a significant tendency towards optimistic forecasts. There are
clearly other contributors here – political and/or psychological biases (Flyvbjerg
et al., 2006, Flyvbjerg, 2006).
During project implementation, there are a number of techniques which attempt
to correct future predictions of project outcome based on current performance.
For example, Earned Value management integrates cost, schedule and technical
performance and has been widely used for forecasting project durations. The
Earned Value method provides early indications of project performance to
highlight the need for corrective action (Fleming and Koppelman, 1996).
However, employing Earned Value has had limited success in improving the
accuracy of on-going project estimates (Boehm and DeMarco, 1997, DeMarco,
1982).
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Political
Some researchers have stated that there are systemic problems in providing
project forecasts, even to the point where purposeful underestimation of costs
and overestimation of scope and time are common to gain project approval and
funding (Wachs, 1989). Frequently, pre-sales teams and/or project managers,
eager to get projects funded, resort to a form of deception (Cliffe et al., 2000),
over-promising what their project will do, understating how much it will cost,
and when it will be completed. Many projects start off with budgets that are too
small (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). In the planning phase, project proposals are not
fully explored because of the nature of the bidding process to over-promise in
order to win funding and the frequent need for a rapid response. With the
benefit of hindsight, project managers often believe that they have taken on an
overly ambitious project, committed to by, for instance, a pre-sales team
(Taylor, 2006).
How this bias plays out during project implementation is not clear, though there
are clearly issues with the ‘acceptability’ of reports by different stakeholders.
This will be an area for further research.
Psychological
Political ‘deception’ of project forecasts is an intentional behavioural strategy;
conscious bias is introduced to increase the probability of gaining project
acceptance. In contrast, psychological bias subconsciously introduces optimism
into initial forecasts. Our purpose here is to determine whether there is any
evidence that psychological bias should end once initial planning is complete,
and to understand some of the factors that may drive this bias to be evident in
project execution.
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Yates (1990) confirmed the presence of two factors that are relevant here: over-
optimism in estimates, and overconfidence in the reliability of those estimates.
The causes behind these two factors have been studied extensively. For
instance, when considering future events, people generally have an overly
positive view of themselves, seeing their outcomes as being more positive than
those of other people. They see themselves as less likely to experience negative
events and more likely to experience positive events. Known as the ‘planning
fallacy’, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) analysed everyday planning practices
and determined that people generate overly confident and optimistic predictions
because they accentuate their talents and the degree of control they have over
the environment (inside view) and neglect or avoid evidence about past
prediction failure in similar tasks (outside view) (Ying et al., 2006).
The dissociation of the past from the present and the strong focus on future
plan-based outcomes is magnified by the need of the decision-makers to act.
Doubts about decisions are downgraded and suppressed through wishful thinking
and the illusion of control (Slovic, 1987, Slovic et al., 1980). The bias towards
positive stimuli relates to the temptation to give people the answers they want
to hear, and those answers to have apparent certainty or a perception of a safe
and predictable world (Beierle, 2004).
In addition, individuals tend to fall prey to a host of self-deceptions which lead to
pervasive optimism bias (Sitkin and Weingart, 1995). For example, when
considering future life-events, such as divorce or serious illness, people generally
have an overly positive view of themselves, seeing their outcomes as being more
positive than those of other people. They see themselves as less likely to
experience negative events and more likely to experience positive events. This
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phenomenon has been described as unrealistic optimism (Royer, 2000) or
comparative optimism (Weinstein, 1980).
For the purpose of this study, we have identified from the literature five key
contributors to delusional optimism that would be present in the context of
project delivery. First, people’s predictions tend to mirror hopes and ambitions
for desired outcomes. Rather than considering past outcomes, wishful thinking is
applied and current intentions are projected into desirable outcomes of future
events. This cognitive process of motivated reasoning has been described in
detail by Waerneryd (1996) and others (e.g. Pidgeon et al., 1983). A recent
study by Sitkin and Weingart (1995) has shown that when developing mental
models of scenarios in which positive future events occur, certain parts of the
brain are more active then when imagining negative future events or past
events.
Second, based on attribution theory, individuals tend to ascribe successes and
failures related to past events to different factors. Frequently, successes are
attributed to internal causes such as personal ability and resilience, while failures
are attributed to external forces, such as unfortunate circumstances or a
particularly difficult task (Pablo, 1999). Individuals’ explanations of why
successes or failures occurred have an important effect on whether information
about a past event will be considered important for the prediction of an outcome
of a future event. In particular, past events will be considered of little
importance when their failure is attributed to external factors and/or when
implications of the past project could challenge optimistic future plans (Jaafari,
2001). We term this factor outcome attribution.
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Third, individuals tend to overestimate their personal role in positive outcomes
related to events of the past. They perceive their contributions to be bigger than
warranted. This misperception leads them to believe that their locus of control to
steer a scenario toward a desired outcome is greater than warranted by
objective judgement (Jaafari, 2001). This individual bias is also called the
egocentricity bias (Livingstone Smith, 2004).
Fourth, the expectancy-value model suggests that individuals who are high in
dispositional optimism versus dispositional pessimism are better at identifying
suitable goals. They have great confidence in achieving that goal and are
resilient in pursuing it. However, when they are not able to identify an attainable
goal, these individuals tend to stay committed to the unattainable goal or
disengage from goal attainment (give up on the project) (Jemison, 1987). This is
the paradox of dispositional optimism.
Fifth, offering a general model for the generation of expectations, Krizan and
Windschitl (2007) suggest nine mediators influencing individuals’ likely
judgements for expected outcomes (outcome desirability). Based on this model,
people go through three basic cognitive mechanisms in order to form
expectations. During the first stage a search for evidence is undertaken. This
search will favour knowledge which is consistent with the desired outcome and
therefore it promotes optimism bias, just as repeated simulation of the scenario
and focusing on a particular entity tend to do. In phase two of expectation
formation, selected evidence will be evaluated. At this point in the process,
information will then enter the third phase and either undergo differential
scrutiny or enhanced accuracy, once again leading to bias.
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In summary, optimism bias is clearly commonly observed and well understood in
many fields of human activity. None of the factors identified here as leading to
delusional optimism (motivated reasoning, outcome attribution, egocentricity
bias, the paradox of dispositional optimism, outcome desirability) could be said
to end with the end of the planning stage of a project. Previous studies (e.g.
Flyvbjerg, 2006, Kemerer, 1991, MacDonald, 2002, H. M. Treasury, 2003) have
focused on biases inherent in the act of planning. Little attention has been paid
to project execution where project managers take evidence about the progress
of the project into account. Project execution is usually the longest phase in the
project life cycle and it typically consumes the most energy and the most
resources. However, recent studies have failed to illustrate to what extent
optimism continues into this phase and if it does, the nature of the psychological
bias that accompanies it.
Hence, our research question is ‘Does on-going optimism occur during project
execution and if it does, what is the nature of the psychological bias in this
sustained optimism?’ The author team have seen that sustained false optimism
was often present in practice, but such anecdotal evidence was not amenable to
further analysis. The opportunity presented itself for an attempt to isolate the
phenomenon, and explore it a little further in a controlled environment.
METHODS
The data for this study were gathered from a project management simulation. In
this competitive exercise 28 teams of six students planned and executed the
simulated construction of a warehouse under a fixed price contract. The profile
of the students who participated is as follows:
Table 1: Profile of sample
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Average Age Work experience Job function
25-28 years 24% 0-2 years
3-5 years
0%
30%
General Management 27%
29-32 years 37% 6-10 years 44% Project Management 7%
33-36 years 27% 11+ years 26% HR 2%
37+ years 12% Sales/Marketing 12%
Research and Development 4%
IT 10%
Business Development 5%
Consulting/Management Services 12%
Finance/Banking 10%
Scientific Engineering 11%
The participants have a minimum of three years’ work experience with over 90%
having worked in an environment that included some form of project planning
and control. Our first task in the design of the experiment was that in order to
isolate psychological reasons for sustained optimism, political and technical
influences had to be avoided. Purposeful over-promising can be excluded
because external stakeholders were not part of the simulation and although it
was a competition, there was neither motivation nor any indication that the
participants deliberately inflated their targets. Experiential and technical
reasons, however, such as the issue of knowing-what (e.g. knowledge) and
knowing-how (e.g. skill), needed to be addressed in order to avoid any distortion
of results. In particular during the planning stage but also during the execution
phase, coaching on technical matters of planning was provided by the tutors.
Specifically, in order to plan the entire project, the students were introduced to a
scheduling technique, cash-flow analysis and Earned Value management as a
control tool. The planning stage of the simulation included extensive practice of
the prescribed tools and techniques. The students carried out ‘dry-runs’ and
enquiries about how to apply a technique were fully addressed. Teams were
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required to demonstrate use of the tools and this was checked by the tutors. All
teams were provided with detailed information on the project such as financial
constraints, the sequence of work and labour requirements for each package of
work several days in advance of the exercise to allow time for planning. During
the simulation, the cost of workers, price of materials and lead-times was fixed.
The only type of variability was the non-linear progress of work packages.
The execution phase of the simulation was run over one day, with teams going
through approximately 20 15-minute decision cycles, depending on how they
planned and executed the project. Each cycle required the teams to take
decisions about finance arrangements, the acquisition deployment and disposal
of project resources (e.g. labour, construction equipment, consumables)
together with a profit forecast. Each team recorded their decisions on a form
which was handed to the course tutors, who processed the data and provided a
progress report at the end of each cycle. The form also requested the students
to indicate whether and how their final profit will change. This allowed us to
track the on-going pattern of any optimism in their forecasts. In addition to this
quantitative data on performance, we also collected qualitative data. The
qualitative data took the form of short interviews with consenting teams
between the submission of a decision form and the return of a progress report
from the course tutors. The interviews used the following protocol:-
 ‘Please explain your current profit forecast?’ OR
 ‘Please explain why you have changed your profit forecast?’
Follow-up questions were sought to provide further clarification of the reasons
behind their statements, for example ‘Why is that?’ and ‘What do you mean by
that?’ Our intent was to avoid any disruption in the flow of the simulation, so
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each interview was limited to a maximum of five minutes. The interviews were
recorded for subsequent transcription and analysis. Further data were collected
in the form of the teams’ reflections on their performance at the end of the
simulation – a compulsory activity.
RESULTS
Quantitative analysis
Of the 28 teams, only seven were above or less than 20% below their original
profit forecasts. With a mean forecast of £97k profit, but a mean achievement of
less than £25k, all the rest of the teams exhibited optimism bias in their initial
estimating. Overall, this level of performance is slightly better than historical
averages for the simulation (25% achieve their forecasts, average profit £10k).
Considering the dataset as a whole, there was no statistically significant
correlation established between the initial estimates and the final profit figures
achieved – the more optimistic groups were not the better performers.
The most successful of the teams – the seven who delivered above or less than
20% below their initial estimates – are the performers. In contrast to the rest of
the teams, six from this cluster underestimated their final performance. Whilst
this is of interest, and will be taken up in ‘areas for further research’, it is not the
focus of this analysis. In particular, the comparison between the routines,
practices and behaviours of this cluster with other less successful teams, would
be most interesting. The performers’ forecasts compared to their achievements
are shown in Figure 2 and for the purposes of this study this cluster is of no
further interest.
Figure 2: Forecast and performance data for performers cluster
That 75% of the teams exhibited significant optimism bias in their initial
estimates in itself is of interest, but to answer the research question of whether
optimism bias was evident throughout the execution phase, the patterns of
prediction and achieveme
remaining teams. This analysis indicated three demonstrably different
behaviours over time between the remaining teams.
A second cluster of 7 teams was immediately identifiable from the period by
period data. They took the feedback they received, and used it to adjust their
profit forecasts downwards as they went along. For this reason we have termed
these, the trackers. Whilst they clearly und
estimates, their optimism was maintained throughout, albeit reducing as time
progressed. Their performance is shown in Figure 3, as for the performers.
However, in order to illustrate this behaviour, the patterns in indivi
performance were found to be far more revealing than aggregated patterns, and
an illustrative example from one of the teams is shown in Figure 4. Their level of
optimism is represented in the figure by the difference between their period by
nt were analysed on a period by period basis for these
erperformed compared to initial
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dual groups’
period forecast, and their final performance. The chart shows the decline in their
optimism, but even at the end, they were still expecting their results to be better
than they actually achieved.
Figure 3: Forecast and performance
Figure 4: Time-series for optimism
The third cluster of 11 teams, demonstrated a similarly interesting behaviour
pattern. Despite there being no value in maintaining their initial estimates,
adjustments to initial profit forecasts were relatively minor and it was only late
in the simulation that significant adjustments downwards were made. In two of
these cases, despite evidence that performance was not as they had expected,
data for trackers cluster
- tracker
19
their
profit forecasts were inexplicably increased, before then being revised
downwards. This behaviour was demonstrated by
termed the lemmings due to their profit forecasts suddenly ‘falling off a cliff.’
Their overall performance is shown in Figure
lemming-type pattern from the data is shown in Figure 6. This includes an
unexpected rise in this group’s forecast occurring in period 14, and ‘the cliff’
happening at period 22,
Interestingly here, and different to
appears to have disappeared almost entirely at the point where their estimates
are reduced.
Figure 5: Forecast and performance data for lemmings
1
We are aware that this is a mythical property of lemmings.
11 teams, who we have
5 and an illustrative example of a
two periods before their project was comp
that of the trackers, the optimism bias
cluster
20
1
leted.
Figure 6: Time-series for optimism
Lastly there were three teams who gave up reporting altogether once it became
clear that they were not going to achieve anything like their initial profit targets.
This was despite the reports being value
that of the previous clusters, but with the difference that the disappearance of
their optimism led to a withdrawal from the reporting process. All of these teams
made significant losses. The pattern of optimism in the forecasts from one of the
teams is shown in Figure 7. They maintain behaviour as for the lemmings group
until period 15. Their optimism disperses over the next
switching to a state of growing pessimism.
period 22, but they did no
much better than they expected. This cluster we termed the
- lemming.
-free. Their behaviour was similar to
two
Their project did
t report after period 19. Their final result was actually
lost.
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periods before
not finish until
Figure 7: Time-series for optimism
In this first part of the analysis of this quasi
clusters of teams, based on their level of optimism in their
their profit figures at completion of their project. Of these four clusters, three
exhibited the phenomenon that was the subject of this study
termed sustained false optimism
clusters; for the trackers, it pervaded throughout the project, though reducing
with time; for the lemmings it ended very abruptly; for the lost it ended and
then switched to overt pessimism. We are not suggesting these are the only
categories of behaviour, or that o
behaviour. Indeed, Figure 7 shows a clear example of lemming behaviour up
until period 15. Their lapsing into pessimism differentiated their behaviour at the
end of the project.
The second part of our research q
Qualitative analysis
The data so far have shown the two aspects of optimism bias (optimistic
forecasts and overconfidence in their robustness) among the non
- lost.
-experiment, we identified four
on-going
. The nature of this differed between the
ne group will only exhibit one pattern of
uestion concerned the nature of the bias.
22
forecasts of
– what we have
-performing
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teams, as would be expected from the literature (e.g. Yates, 1990). From the
literature we also identified five psychological biases that would be relevant to
our phenomenon of sustained false optimism – motivated reasoning, outcome
attribution, egocentricity bias, paradox of dispositional optimism, and outcome
desirability. The data are framed using these categories.
The students took the simulation very seriously, with many groups working late
into the night to prepare and hone their plans. Every aspect of the simulation
was examined and pored over, often in great detail. As one (typical) student
commented:
“We think we considered every detail, so we have all the accommodation
issues, we pay recruitment fees, we have in the equipment not only the
equipment costs but also the issue insurance till the end of the task when
the equipment is needed, all the consumables with the respective stock
holding costs, cranes. We used supporting tables to help manage all the
complicated stuff like consumables, cranes and the details with the
workers. Then we have the fixed overheads and then in the end we have
information relating to the loans – interest payable, interest receivable.
We have a formula …, so it automatically calculates everything.”
Most teams noted that the prescribed planning tools were easy to use and their
effectiveness was rarely questioned. When asked about their confidence in their
planning, most did not raise any doubts about the suitability of the applied
planning tools. Teams found the tools ‘useful’ because it enabled them to
visualise a previously invisible entity.
In terms of optimism bias, we noted that the planning tools, in most cases, did
not prevent optimistic forecasts from being produced. More importantly, the
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application of the tools themselves contributed to an artificially high level of
confidence in the forecasts. As will be shown, there are a number of reasons for
this, with project management tools supporting the psychological biases that
have been identified.
Motivated reasoning
This bias is the result of a cerebral process that favours individuals considering
positive rather than negative outcomes. A number of the teams exhibited this.
When asked about their confidence in the outcome of their planning activities,
the majority of teams argued that what they planned would actually occur.
Typical responses during the early stages of the project execution included:
“There are no big surprises that are coming our way.”
and
“We know what will be happening.”
The bias and the accompanying rhetoric showed that the positive outcome
possibility had prevented the consideration in any detail of potential problems.
Outcome attribution
This bias is where a positive outcome is attributed to the actions of the team,
whilst any negative outcome is blamed on external factors. For instance, when
questioned about the predictive validity of their forecasts, one team member
noted that:
“I think it is down mainly to our teamwork, to our pre-planning and
basically working to make sure that all processes are working efficiently”.
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In addition, although teams revised their plans in order to cope with changes
that emerged, they still did not recognise the possibility of further unforeseen
events:
“Yeah, we’re going to have more changes of course, but I think we have a
good model here.”
“…which is a little bit disappointing but again we’d planned for this sort of
thing to be happening. So in a way, that’s what it’s there for, but at the
same time, you’re kind of regretful that we should have done – we should
have made the tool totally foolproof and obviously there was a hole in it.
It looked foolproof to start with and obviously something slipped through
the net. So, hopefully we’ve redesigned it, so hopefully it won’t happen
again.”
Two things are shown here – despite the fact that the models were clearly not
working, the belief in ‘we have a good model’ seemed hard to shake.
Furthermore, the failure of the model was not attributed to students’ actions,
and the redesign re-established its validity.
The belief in the predictive value of their initial planning was reinforced by initial
periods of contentment and self-satisfaction. Contingencies were not used and
progress was achieved according to plan. Plans were not adjusted and a
continuous need for reflection on planning was eroded. Some teams recognised
that they had grown complacent because the project had appeared to be
proceeding according to plan:
“That was the one thing we did, and up until then we had got a bit
complacent because everything was really smooth and then all of a
sudden… We couldn’t work out for two cycles why the performance was so
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slow. So probably with hindsight we would have just integrated something
like better check-listing I suppose. But we just got lulled into a false
sense of security I think because it was ticking over very nicely.”
The language of the teams, justifying their confidence in their planning despite
contradicting data, underlines that they were preoccupied with success rather
than failure. The sensitivity of their models to unexpected events was
downplayed and an illusion of control over uncertainty exercised. Threats were
not considered. It appears that any unexpected events were not given credence
because it contradicted their established routine; a routine to rigidly follow their
plan. Countermeasures to break out of this routine were not observed or only
had a little impact on isolated problems for the non-performing teams.
Egocentricity bias
This is the bias that overstates the influence of the individual on the outcome. It
was expressed as a notion of being ‘in control’ by the participating teams and
their confidence that their actions through their initial planning were sufficiently
robust to absorb any unexpected events. However, as the quantitative analysis
shows, not only were the forecasts highly optimistic, despite the inclusion of
buffers and contingencies, but teams also tended to under-adjust their
predictions. Weak signals such as
“Yeah, we had a slight delay in the progress of the procurement, and the
roadwork”
were in many cases ignored; no questions were asked about whether this
problem would have a knock-on effect. Indeed, this ‘slight delay’ would be very
likely to completely throw out the plans for the rest of the project. Problems
were looked at in isolation, their impacts downplayed:
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“It could have been a lot worse”
and further unexpected events were not taken into consideration. Hence, despite
the occurrence of surprises in their projects, teams stubbornly argued that they
would be able to recover from any future event – overstating their influence on
the outcome:
“It’s based on our own value up to this point, which is where we said it
was going to be. So we’re on track for our expected profit at the end.”
“All our delays that are happening, we already have a buffer in place for
that.”
“We have just revisited the spread sheet now and the finances are a little
bit off what we predicted, and certainly our forecast is a little bit off what
we predicted from the last session.”
Paradox of dispositional optimism
This was noted from the literature to be present in groups with high dispositional
optimism. Their response to feedback indicating impending failure would then be
to continue to hang on to their initial targets until they either finished the project
or abandoned their optimism and withdrew from the process. The lemmings
group undoubtedly illustrated the former behaviour, whilst the latter was
probably best illustrated by the lost groups. They withdrew from the reporting
process and were reluctant to offer subsequent comments or to discuss their
performance.
Outcome desirability
This is the bias where the wish to be seen as a high-performing team would
naturally lead to bias in the reporting of progress. Whilst we have ample
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evidence of the competitiveness of the teams, there is little to indicate this as
directly having an impact in this study.
DISCUSSION
Our research question is: ‘Does on-going optimism occur in project execution
and if it does, what is the nature of the psychological bias in this sustained
optimism?’ This paper establishes the phenomenon of sustained false optimism
– the existence of delusional optimism beyond the planning phase of a project.
It also provides qualitative evidence as to ‘why’, based on the presence of five
causes of optimism bias: motivated reasoning, outcome attribution, egocentricity
bias, paradox of dispositional optimism and, possibly, outcome desirability.
In the context of this study, optimism bias was observed at a group level. At an
individual level, behaviours resulting from optimism bias have been explained by
behavioural and social psychology. We propose that throughout the execution of
the project simulation students felt prey to a number of cognitive self-deceptions
leading to biases similar to those described in the planning fallacy (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979).
The initial profit forecast served as a first reference point and acted as a mental
anchor for students. For 75% of the teams, this reference point was highly
optimistic. Lovallo and Kahneman (2003, p. 60) report anchoring as “…one of
the strongest and most prevalent of cognitive biases” in the context of project
planning. Anchoring leads individuals and teams to hold on to forecasts which
have been skewed toward optimism in the first place. Subsequently, contingency
budgets for possible expansions or problems occurring throughout the project
are kept small and frequently prove to be insufficient. The results of this study
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suggest anchoring occurs throughout all phases of project execution for a
significant proportion of project teams (nearly a third in this study).
Further, our findings suggest that in the non-performing teams, optimism in
forecasts was not reduced through the craft of applying forecasting techniques
(know-how) and nearly perfect knowledge about the simulated project and its
degree of variation (know-what). In contrast, it seems plausible that a high
perceived ease of use and perceived usefulness in combination with a high
perceived sense of certainty reinforced the sustainment of optimism. Expert-like
epistemic and technical arrogance may hence be a factor to critically evaluate.
However, simply accepting that such epistemic and technical arrogance exists,
and will persist for a percentage of projects (what this is outside this simulation
needs to be established), is a first step to finding approaches to work with this
behavioural complexity. Key to this may be the external view – being able to
bring people into a team who have not been party to earlier optimism or who
have not yet developed presumptions towards knowledge and in particular to
tools. An expert as such will have the skill to question knowledge and tools alike
that are often advocated as ‘self-evidently correct’ (Williams, 2005).
It may be possible to develop more sophisticated tools that are able to identify
behaviours associated with sustained false optimism, and provide incentives for
their reduction. Most research suggests that optimism in projects and
programmes can be overcome by reducing the behavioural element of bias or by
compensating for bias through the inclusion of uplifts. Yet, alongside individual
and group-related behavioural issues, this research also provides indications that
the applied processes and procedures themselves facilitate the creation of
optimistic planning. Prior to anchoring their projections, individuals have to form
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expectations in relation to projected outcomes (Krizan and Windschitl, 2007). In
the context of this study, the search for evidence may have been influenced by a
false sense of security relating to the planning tools and knowledge available
throughout the project simulation. After all, the tools were taught as part of a
project planning course. Therefore, students have felt throughout the execution
phase that the use of these tools would surely lead to success not only in
planning, but also during execution of the project simulation. Hence, the taught
‘usefulness’ by the instructors and the resulting perceived ‘usefulness’ of
processes and procedures to manage uncertainty has partially led to delusional
sense increased planning quality and certainty. The self-evident correctness of
the applied methods may have reinforced the ignorance of uncertainty. Whether
deliberate or accidental, such ignorance needs to be counteracted:
“As with quality assurance, it is beneficial to have one person whose job
is to play devil’s advocate – to look for the reason that a project might fail
and keep managers and developers from ignoring risks in the planning
and execution.” (Nelson, 2007, p. 75)
Instead of unilaterally applying uplifts to compensate for optimism bias, the
recommended step is to “Consider whether the optimism bias factor can be
reduced according to the extent to which the contributory factors have been
managed and mitigated.” (H. M. Treasury, 2003). Similarly, adding more
processes is unlikely to be helpful. Recognising and working with behaviours is
more likely to improve results.
The implications of these behavioural interventions for project implementation
are significant. Having a non-performing project is undesirable, but the
behaviours shown here indicate that traditional control systems may be unable
to prevent impending failure. A tracker would exhibit significant optimism
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throughout the project, as would a lemming. The only difference for the
organisation is the timing of the realisation that there is a problem. A lost
project, similarly, would be problematic, with optimism preceding withdrawal
from the reporting process potentially providing a warning, but again, may be
too late for remedial action to be taken. Any of these, both personally for PM
professionals and organisationally, are damaging.
Limitations
This study is not without its limitations. As we have already alluded to, carrying
out a quasi-experiment as part of an MBA project simulation offered us the
unique opportunity to largely exclude the aspects of technical error and strategic
misrepresentation in a predominantly linear and predictive environment.
However, the environment in which we carried out the experiment will have had
an influence on the extent and nature of sustained optimism. For example, the
students were prescribed to adhere to a range of planning tools. Such
enforcement, although not untypical in real-life projects, may have distorted the
participants’ perception about their degree of realism.
Conclusions
The contribution of this paper is to show that the previously observed
phenomenon of optimism bias is not restricted to the planning phase of projects.
Instead, it has been observed, throughout the execution of a project, to be
present in a significant group of projects that failed to meet their initial
performance forecasts. This we have termed, sustained false optimism. The
contribution of psychological bias to this sustained false optimism has been
explored.
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Whilst tools and techniques – earned value in particular – attempt to predict
project out-turn, they do rely on good data. Behavioural interventions, such as
those seen in 75% of the teams in this simulation, give an indication of
interventions that prevent such ‘good data’ being presented or used by a team.
Gaining an understanding of the cognitive mechanisms that led to such
behaviours may help to identify possible remedies in order to better predict
project out-turn in the future, or simply stop projects that may otherwise end up
as non-performing.
FUTURE RESEARCH
In this study, we have investigated one aspect of sustained false optimism – the
contribution of psychological bias. The findings of such a study are clearly
indicative rather than comprehensive, and their application in practice is an
immediate avenue for further work. Further simulation will also provide
additional insights for testing in practice. For instance, future research may
include the introduction of external cues – the mean performance in this
simulation over hundreds of groups is nearer to a £10k profit. Half the groups in
a future study may be given this information, and the response to it studied to
see at what point it impacts on their decision-making.
The other contributors to sustaining false optimism – political and technical bias
– also need to be considered. Whilst they are well understood for project
planning and appraisal, there are important differences in the roles played by
key stakeholders in implementation that makes further exploration worthwhile.
Following from this, the interaction and combination of these contributors should
be examined.
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Of the seven teams in the performers cluster, six had underestimated their
performance. This group is of interest and further work could be conducted to
compare their behaviours with those of the other clusters.
Finally, further studies which, like this one, offer opportunities of gathering data
from a range of teams performing the planning and execution of similar tasks
under similar epistemic conditions are needed to better understand the wider
range of ‘behavioural interventions’ that are evident in projects. Such studies
may be carried out in an industrial but controllable setting, with the impact of
variables such as task complexity and different tools and techniques of planning,
monitoring and controlling, on behaviours evaluated. It does appear that ‘self-
evident correct processes’ are not at all robust with regard to behavioural
interventions and this is a rich vein for research in the future.
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